The consequences of this view are discussed at length. It focuses on the fact that for Hervaeus “intentionality” indicates a non-real relation from the known thing to the knower. The doctrine is presented as being part of medieval discussions concerning Aristotle’s “being as the true and the false.” This dissertation challenges the reigning hermeneutic applied to the treatise, a hermeneutic that tends to emphasize questions pertaining to cognition and “realism.” This chapter explains Hervaeus’s position that second intentions are relationes rationis formed by all three acts of the intellect. The third chapter presents the overall view of Hervaeus’s intentionality doctrine. It advocates a broader interpretation of Scotus’s position than is sometimes advanced in the scholarly literature on this topic. The chapter also discusses the ambiguities found in Scotus’s remarks regarding the relationship between the various acts of intellection and the formation of second intentions. This distinction is important for Hervaeus, and its likely Scotistic provenance is not given adequate attention in the scholarly literature. The chapter emphasizes Scotus’s use of the distinction between subjective and objective existence in explaining his views concerning logic and second intentions. The second chapter focuses on the advances and ambiguities found in the thought of John Duns Scotus, who is presented as an important proximate source for Hervaeus’s treatise. Then, two emblematic 13th century figures are considered, namely Robert Kilwardby and Thomas Aquinas. The first chapter frames the De secundis intentionibus from the perspective of Aristotle’s remarks in the Metaphysics regarding “being as the true and the false” and Avicenna’s brief remarks regarding second intentions at the beginning of his Liber de prima philosophia. This dissertation articulates this interpretation of the treatise. The De secundis intentionibus shows itself to be a generally conservative attempt to explain the nature of logic from a broadly Peripatetic perspective. notions such as genus, species, enunciation, syllogism, and others-are relationes rationis that are a kind of “non-being” in comparison with the ten categories. Hervaeus’s treatise considers in detail the metaphysical claims necessary for maintaining that second intentions-i.e. As the 14th century opened, thinkers focused on the nature of logic vis-à-vis the inherited Aristotelian schema of sciences and ontology. As anyone who has written a dissertation knows, such work is subject to many limitations-not the least of which is the desire merely to have the dissertation completed and endlessly be in graduate school! The official abstract for the works is as follows: Hervaeus Natalis’s De secundis intentionibus represents the crystalization of an important philosophical tradition concerning the nature of logic. However, I see no reason to revisit this in a book-length project along the lines of the dissertation itself. My thought on these matters has been developed (and, in some ways superseded) by two articles in the ACPQ: "Beyond Non-Being: omistic Metaphysics on Second Intentions, Ens morale, and Ens articiale" (Summer 2017) and "Thomism and the Formal Object of Logic" (Summer 2019). While I would rewrite various aspects of it, I thought it to be worthwhile to post it online in case there were others who might be interested. Help us to trust in you and your ways.ğor Jesus' sake, Amen.This is the text of my doctoral dissertation, which I do not plan to publish officially. God of all creation, we acknowledge that our thoughts are not your thoughts and our ways are not your ways. As the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts."Įven in the confusion of life, we can be assured that when things do not make sense to us, God knows what he is doing and we can trust him to care for us. God reminds us of this when he says, "My thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways. Often in life we see and experience things that don't seem to make sense to us, and just as often we are called to trust that God knows what he is doing. But then he went on to explain that one day while he was walking through the woods, an acorn fell and hit him on the head-and suddenly he realized that God must know exactly what he is doing. It seemed that in a creation that was proportional an oak tree should have a large seed, about the size of a pumpkin, and a small plant like a pumpkin vine should have a small seed, about the size of an acorn. He showed them a pumpkin and an acorn, and he said he could never figure out why God had created such a small seed for a large tree and why he had created such a large gourd for such a small plant. A pastor once told this story to the children in his church.
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